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# Primary and Secondary Socialization Impacts on Support for Same-Sex Marriage After Legalization in the Netherlands

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Two years after the legalization of same-sex marriages in the Netherlands, 65% of the Dutch population largely or completely disagrees with the statement "gay marriage should be abolished." This article shows, by way of multinomial logistic regression analysis of survey data, which socializing agents influence one's attitude toward same-sex marriage after its legalization (FNB2003;  $N = 2,124$ ). Parents' attitudes toward homosexuality during one's youth strongly affect one's attitude toward same-sex marriage. The strongest determinant is socialization within religious institutions. Religious practice provides an explanation of the differences between members of denominations opposing same-sex marriage. A lower educational level enhances one's probability of being neutral on abolishing gay marriage. Finally, men and people from non-Western origin are especially likely to oppose same-sex marriage.

**Keywords:** *same-sex marriage; homosexuality; socialization; parental attitudes*

In many European countries, one of the largest recent changes in family law has been the introduction of same-sex marriages and same-sex registration possibilities. Denmark was in 1989 the first country in the world to introduce same-sex partnerships. The legalization of these civil unions soon followed in Norway (1993), Sweden (1995), Hungary (1995), and in the Netherlands

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
(1998), which became the first country to legalize same-sex marriages in 2001. The Dutch law annihilated all juridical differences between gay couples and heterosexual couples. The legal recognition of same-sex marriage spread to other countries: Belgium (2003), Spain (2005), Canada (2005), and South Africa (2006). It remains however a blazing issue in many other countries. Australia passed a law banning same-sex marriages in 2004. In three U.S. states (including California) during the 2008 presidential election, voters could cast their ballot on a state constitutional amendment to ban same-sex marriages. In all of these states, the majority rejected same-sex marriages. Shortly before U.S. election day, the *Boston Globe* ran an article headlined "Slow Road Advised for Gay Marriage" about what the United States could learn from the Netherlands regarding openness to marriage for homosexual couples (Sennott, 2004). In this contribution, we study the Dutch population's attitude toward same-sex marriage after its legalization. This study is one of the first to provide such data.

It is hard to judge whether there has been a run on marriage in the Dutch gay community since the legalization of same-sex marriage, because we do not know the total number of homosexuals. Statistics Netherlands reported in 2001, the year same-sex marriage was legalized, 2,414 same-sex marriages, the equivalent of 2.9% of all sealed marriages from that year. In 2002 and 2003, this percentage was, respectively, 2.1% and 1.9%. After the introduction of same-sex marriage in 2001, the number of so-called registered partnerships for homosexuals previously legalized in 1998 (unsurprisingly) dropped. In 2004 and 2005, 2.1% and in 2006, 2.2% of all reported marriages and partnerships implicated same-sex partners (see Figure 1).

In the Netherlands, objections have been raised to the opening of marriage to same-sex couples, particularly by religious corners. Moreover, some civil servants from municipal administrations stated they would conscientiously object when obliged to perform gay marriages. One civil servant was fired in 2001 after she repeatedly refused to marry same-sex couples. In recent years, supporters of same-sex marriage seemingly invoke the law to compel immigrants to assimilate, with modern Dutch natives positioning themselves in opposition to traditional immigrants. An incident in April 2005 in which, many suspect, Dutch Moroccans beat up an American gay activist in Amsterdam fueled this antagonism further. Although the Netherlands, according to Kelley (2001), is seen from an international perspective as an extremely tolerant country toward gays, newspapers reported a rising tide of aggression toward homosexuals.

In international research, Herek (1994; Herek & Capitano, 1999; Whitley & Ægisdóttir, 2000) has set the standard on attitudes toward

**Figure 1**  
**Partnerships Registered and Marriages Sealed Between Persons**  
**of the Same Sex as a Percentage of the Total Number**  
**of Registered Partnerships Plus Marriages in the Relevant Year**



Source: Statistics Netherlands, 2008.

homosexuality by developing the Attitude Toward Lesbians (ATL) and Attitude Toward Gays (ATG) Scales. Other researchers used one item only (Kelley 2001), or discussed the unidimensionality of the homophobia scales (Wright, Adams, & Bernat, 1999). Still, other researchers reported a difference between general attitudes toward homosexuality and attitudes toward equal rights for lesbians and gay men (Brooks, 2000; Van de Meerendonk & Scheepers, 2004). Despite this empirically confirmed difference between the two attitudes, previous research addressed the latter dimension less often. In this study, we focus specifically on the attitude toward same-sex marriage. Various Dutch surveys included one single question on the approval of homosexual relations. In 1985, 55% of the population had a positive attitude toward cohabitation of gay or lesbian couples. This increased to 64.9% in 1993.<sup>1</sup> The number of people favoring gay cohabitation or marriage was 60.4% in 1995 and 64.6% in 2000.<sup>2</sup> The same survey yielded in 2000 that 68.4% of the Dutch thought that homosexuals should have equal rights regarding marriage. In this contribution, we use the first measurement on the attitude toward same-sex marriage since its legalization.

Compared with previous research, we will more thoroughly address the influence of socializing agents on the attitude toward same-sex marriage.

Studies until now revealed that men have a more negative stance toward homosexuals than women, and that the lower educated, as the more religious people, tended to deny equal rights for gays and lesbians (Herek, 2006; Ohlander, Batalova, & Treas, 2006; Van de Meerendonk & Scheepers, 2004). We will elaborate on these findings by focusing on what educational tracks men and women have followed. Moreover, we include enhanced measures of religious integration. Addressing the importance of parental socialization of the attitude toward homosexuals is quite new. We study the influence of parental education and religion as well as the influence of parental attitudes toward homosexuality on children's attitude toward abolishing same-sex marriages. To summarize, we answer the questions (a) to what extent do people in the Netherlands approve of opening the institution of marriage to same-sex couples and (b) what factors influence people to want same-sex marriage abolished?

## Expectations

We derive our expectations from socialization theory. Herein we distinguish between primary and secondary socialization. Secondary socialization concerns the transfer of norms and values through institutions such as the church and school, and how strong the ties are between people and institutions. We regard direct parental influence as primary socialization and the extent to which parents' attitudes affect their children's attitudes as a primary socialization effect. When parents transfer on their children institutional effects, such as their educational or religious influence, we name this *secondary-primary* socialization.

## Primary and Secondary-Primary Socialization

The influence from parents on their children is considered an important foundation for the formation of attitudes (Kulik, 2002; Dalhouse & Frideres, 1996; Jennings, 1984; Sears, 1975). Attitudes are shaped particularly during adolescence and, according to the aging-stability hypothesis, remain constant thereafter (Glenn, 1980). Parental influence therefore tends to resurface in later stages of life as well. Recently, Jansen and Kalmijn (2000) and Vollebergh, Iedema, and Raaymakers (2001) showed that in the Netherlands, the mother's attitude regarding sex roles and her sociocultural views influenced her children's attitudes, even in their later life. In this study, we focus on the direct influence of parents' attitudes toward homosexuality while also explaining parents' characteristics that have affected their attitude toward

homosexuality. Because earlier research established that church and school are important venues for secondary socialization regarding attitudes toward homosexuals (Kelley, 2001; Van de Meerendonk & Scheepers, 2004), we expect that the religiousness and education of the parents contribute to the familial transfer of values about homosexuality. We identify such parent characteristics as secondary-primary socialization effects.

Religious institutions vary in their norms about homosexuality, including some religious movements serving as a vehicle for gay emancipation (Oswald, 2002; Yip, 1996). Generally, religious institutions uphold the norm that condemns homosexuality. The Catholic Church—the largest denomination in the Netherlands—has taken the position that homosexual inclinations are not a personal fault, yet it calls homosexuals to chastity (The Holy See, 2006) because the Bible labels such tendencies as “a serious aberration” (Gen. 19:1-29; Rom. 1:24-27; 1 Cor. 6:10; 1 Tim. 1:10). Likewise, the Dutch Reformed Church generally claims that it “accepts the homosexual individual, but rejects the homosexual praxis” (Evangelical Broadcasting Association, 2005). This rejection was stronger in the past than it is now, but even today most religions are at the very least skeptical toward same-sex marriage. The Roman Catholic Church has, via two successive popes, repeatedly rejected same-sex marriage and openly aligned itself with ex-U.S. president George W. Bush, a United Methodist, in advocating a constitutional ban on same-sex marriage. The content of a letter from the Dutch Conference of Bishops to politicians in charge of forming the Netherlands’ new coalition government drew attention to several church-related matters in line with Rome’s position. It stated (Simonis, 2002), “In addition, there is the question of parliament’s acceptance of the prospect of so-called ‘gay marriage,’ which would gravely damage an essential foundation of the laws of creation and an age-old cultural aspect of humanity.” Within religious families, the raising of children probably follows the teachings of the church. We therefore expect families with religious parents to comply with the norms of the church regarding homosexuality, and therefore the probability of their children opposing same-sex marriage is greater than among children socialized by nonreligious parents.

Kelley (2001) reported that in almost all of the nations he studied, disapproval of a sexual relationship between two adults of the same sex was more widespread among the lower educated. Loftus (2001) showed that Americans’ attitudes toward gays became particularly more tolerant when education levels increased. According to Strand (1998), a higher education stimulates openness to new ideas. Van de Meerendonk and Scheepers (2004) as well as Ohlander et al. (2005) reached the same conclusion by

pointing out that higher educated individuals have more opportunities to develop cognitive skills. These skills lead them to more closely abide by the principles of equality generally accepted in our society and to subscribe more strongly to the norms embodied by equality between gays and straights. Applying this reasoning to the home environment, with respect to attitudes toward homosexuality, we expect that as the educational level of parents rises, the children's attitude toward homosexuality will become more favorable and less inclined to oppose same-sex marriage.

The effects of secondary-primary socialization boil down to the hypothesis that religiousness as well as a lower level of education leads parents to conform to an unfavorable attitude regarding homosexuality. This raises questions about the degree to which primary socialization, that is, the transfer of parents' attitude regarding homosexuality on their children, contributes to the attitude of the respondent and to what degree their attitude might explain the expected effects of the parents' religion and education.

## Secondary Socialization

Another question that we want to answer is to what extent effects of primary socialization persist when we purely take secondary socialization into account. We expect own religiousness to be an important predictor of opposing same-sex marriage. Previous studies showed religiousness as the primary factor producing a negative attitude toward homosexuality (Kelley, 2001; Van de Meerendonk & Scheepers, 2004), though these studies did not discount the effects of primary socialization. Given the hypothesis that stronger ties to a group lead to adopting the norms of that group (Durkheim, 1897), we expect people who consider themselves as church members to favor more strongly abolishing same-sex marriage. In this regard, we could also expect differences between denominations. As expressed by the Dutch Evangelical Broadcasting Association in 2005, "Among Dutch Christians there is a deep discord in opinions about homosexuality." Recently, the liberal stance toward homosexuality from the Protestant Church of the Netherlands (PKN) pushed a number of its congregations to detach themselves from the PKN. The PKN leaves the decision to each congregation regarding which position it takes on same-sex marriage. In this way, the PKN deviates from the Roman Catholic Church and the smaller Calvinist churches, which did not join the united PKN, such as the Restored Reformed Church, the Continued Reformed Church in the Netherlands, the Reformed Churches (Liberated), and the Meeting of Believers. We expect Catholics to be more strongly in favor of abolishing same-sex marriage than Protestants. We



anticipate other Christians to be even stronger proponents of abolishing same-sex marriage than Catholics and Protestants. Islam and Judaism also hold a negative view of homosexuality (Nahas & Van der Heijden, 2005; Shokeid, 1995), even though some branches within Judaism support same-sex marriages as well. Therefore, people of a non-Christian faith will also be stronger proponents of abolition of same-sex marriage than non-Church members. The varying degree of religious practice among members of different denominations can partly explain the degree of their objection to same-sex marriage (Burdette, Ellison, & Hill, 2005). A more active religious practice is an expression of stronger religious integration, which consequently enforces norm compliance. Interactions between religious practice and denomination should bring to light whether there are indeed varying integration effects. Moreover, we expect a religious environment to play a role in heightening people's objection to same-sex marriage. As the percentage of believers in the vicinity increases, the pressure to live according to religious norms rises. We thus expect that a greater percentage of Protestants and Catholics in the vicinity will raise the probability of people wanting same-sex marriage abolished.

Van de Meerendonk and Scheepers (2004) investigated the extent to which former church members oppose equal rights for homosexuals, specifically with regard to adoption, housing, and inheritance. Their results showed that former Protestants oppose equal rights more fervently than people without a religious background. Former members of other churches, however, did not differ from people with a nonreligious socialization, in line with the hypothesis drawn up by Van de Meerendonk and Scheepers (2004) that they indeed would not do so. We could, however, also start from the socialization hypothesis. We would then expect the socializing influence of the church regarding homosexual relationships to stay in effect in later stages of life. Having reservations about the views of the church, for example, regarding homosexuality, some members could be prompted to leave the church, but leaving the church does not necessarily result in a change of opinion. Generally, former church members favor abolishing same-sex marriage somewhat more strongly than people socialized in a nonreligious environment. We therefore expect that the anticipated positive effect of the parents' religion on wishing to abolish same-sex marriages will be confirmed after we control for the influence of one's own religion.

Education is the second aspect of purely secondary socialization we deem important. We expect a higher educational level to associate with a weaker objection to same-sex marriage. Together with educational levels, fields of study can also be channels for transferring specific knowledge and

skills (Van de Werfhorst & De Graaf, 2004). The place of humans and human relations differs between fields of education. For instance, many teacher training programs and health-related fields of study pay specific attention to dealing with homosexuality. On the other hand, students who choose a field of study in which human relations play a very minor role—such as technical and agrarian studies—are less likely to be confronted with topics such as of sexual relations deviating from the societal norm. We expect people who have studied within programs centering on humans and human relations to be less opposed to same-sex marriage.

Church and education come together in the type of school—at least in the Netherlands—where distinctions in schools exist between public schools with and those without religious grounding. Schools with a religious character will advocate the vision of the Church to a greater extent than those without biblical precepts. Although we realize that elementary schools are unlikely to pay extensive attention even to the existence of homosexuality, we nonetheless expect the self-evidence of heterosexual relationships to be more strongly shown in Christian schools. It is worth noting here that in the Netherlands, attempts are being made to change the norm of the “heterosexual school” with support from the Ministry of Education (Tielman, 2003).


## **Other Sources of Socialization**

We will control for other sources of socialization. Previous research has shown that gender, age, and cohabitation status are important factors (Hekma, 2004; Kite & Whitley 1996; Plummer, 2001). In addition, we expect the country of origin to play an important role. In no other country in the world do people have such a tolerant attitude toward homosexuality as in the Netherlands (Kelley, 2001). We thus expect immigrants who were not socialized in the liberal Dutch climate to be more negative toward same-sex marriage than Dutch natives. We summarize our expectations in Figure 2.

## **Method**

The data we use to investigate why and to what extent people in the Netherlands feel that same-sex marriage should be abolished stem from the Netherlands Family Survey (De Graaf, De Graaf, Kraaykamp, & Ultee, 2003). This was a face-to-face survey of the Dutch population between 18

**Figure 2**  
**Conceptual Model of Primary and Secondary Socialization**  
**Effects on Favoring Abolishing Same-Sex Marriage**



and 70 years of age. The survey involved interviews with 2,174 respondents. The questionnaire consisted of an oral part and some fill-in forms. The response rate for this survey reached 52.6%, which is relatively high for the Netherlands. Primary respondents and their spouses were interviewed in the winter of 2003-2004.

### Dependent Variable

The dependent variable was put to the respondents as a single statement that read, "Gay marriage should be abolished." The Dutch equivalent of the term *gay marriage* was used rather than *same-sex marriage* as the former alliterates in Dutch (*homo-huwelijk*) and is commonly used. Other items about homosexuality in the questionnaire (attitude toward homosexuality in general, attitude toward adoption of children by homosexuals, and attitude toward freedom of civil servant to refuse marrying gays) turned out to be relatively strongly associated with this item. Also, factor analyses showed

**Table 1**  
**Frequency Distribution of Responses to the Question**  
**of Whether Same-Sex Marriage Should Be Abolished (*n* = 2,150)**

Gay Marriage Should Be Abolished	%	
1 = <i>Completely disagree</i>	49.0	} 65.0
2 = <i>Largely disagree</i>	16.0	
3 = <i>Don't agree or disagree</i>	19.5	19.5
4 = <i>Largely agree</i>	4.0	} 15.6
5 = <i>Completely agree</i>	11.6	

Source: Netherlands Family Survey 2003.

that the item in question together with other items about homosexuality formed one dimension. Nonetheless, because we focus specifically on same-sex marriage, we limit ourselves to this singular statement. As shown in Table 1, the largest proportion of the respondents completely or mostly disagreed with the statement favoring to abolish same-sex marriage (65.0%). A minority of 15.6% favored abolishing same-sex marriage. Another 19.5% of respondents placed themselves in the middle category, whereas 24 respondents with missing data were omitted from the analysis.<sup>3</sup> The skewed distribution of this variable makes linear regression impossible although we are dealing with an ordinal variable. In an ordinal regression analysis, it turned out that the assumption of parallel regression lines was violated (compare Long, 1997). We therefore applied multinomial logistic regression models in which we estimated the probability of favoring versus the probability of opposing abolishing same-sex marriage and the probability of staying neutral versus the probability of opposing abolishing same-sex marriage.

*Characteristics of the family of origin.* We examined the degree of parental religiousness, parental educational level, and parental attitude toward homosexuality when the respondent was about 15 years old and how these influenced the respondent's current attitude. These three parental characteristics were measured by means of retrospective questions. Because the characteristics of the father and those of the mother correlate strongly, we tested the influence of both separately. Theoretically, the mother's influence on attitudes is expected to be greater than the father's, which was corroborated by previous research (Bao, Whitbeck, Hoyt, & Conger, 1999). Therefore, our basic models include the characteristics of the mother. In Appendix B, models with the father's characteristics are compared to the models presented in the next section. For 25 of the respondents, the mother had died before they

reached the age of 13. We omitted these respondents from the analyses and the 66 respondents whose fathers had died before he or she was 13 years were omitted in analyzing the father's influence. One respondent did not provide any answer about parental characteristics. Hence the number of respondents in the analyses became 2,124.

*Attitude of parents regarding homosexuality.* In the written questionnaire, we asked respondents to think back to their adolescence and estimate their parents' opinions at that time. We kept the question as general as possible, namely, "What did your parents think about homosexuality?" preceded by an introduction under the heading "Parents' Opinions," which read as follows: "In some families, not all subjects were easily discussed. For that reason, it is often difficult to indicate exactly what your parents thought. Please try nonetheless to estimate as accurately as possible the opinions your parents held when you were about 15 years old." The answering categories varied from strongly unfavorable to strongly favorable. In addition, a don't-know option was offered, with which we attempted to arrive at a less problematic measurement. In the analysis, we also included a don't-know category as a dummy. For the current analysis, we divided the other categories into unfavorable, neutral, and favorable. The neutral attitude served as the reference category. In Table 2, we present the frequency distribution of the parents' attitude regarding homosexuality. Next to these percentages, we show the respondents' answers to the same question regarding their own current general opinion about homosexuality. As expected, respondents reported that their parents held a negative attitude more often than their own current attitude. Almost one third of the respondents indicated that their mother thought unfavorably about homosexuality. One of six respondents (18.3%) could not estimate what his or her mother thought. Respondents thought their fathers opposed homosexuality more than their mothers, though the measurement of the mother's and the father's attitude correlate .75. Almost half of the respondents currently hold a clearly favorable attitude, whereas they ascribed to 13.8% of their mothers and to only 7.3% of their fathers such a positive attitude at the time of their adolescence. Obviously we are aware of the problems with the retrospective measurement, because it could be distorted by the respondent's current attitude. But the findings strengthen our confidence in the measurement of the parents' earlier attitudes, as respondents do not just equalize parental attitudes to their own. Previously, Alwin, Cohen, and Newcomb (1991) showed that a retrospective measurement, even after a period of 50 years, strongly correlates with the attitudes stated earlier. One difference is that we asked respondents not to answer about themselves retrospectively but about their

**Table 2**  
**Frequency Distribution of Both Parents' Attitude**  
**Toward Homosexuality When the Respondent Was Around 15**  
**Years of Age and of Respondent's Current Views ( $n = 2,124$ )**

	Respondents About Their Mother	Respondents About Their Father	Respondents About Themselves
Favorable	13.5	7.4	45.3
Neutral	35.1	33.3	41.3
Unfavorable	33.1	40.2	13.1
Don't know	18.3	19.1	0.2

Source: Netherlands Family Survey 2003.

**Table 3**  
**Cross Tabulation of Mother's Attitude Toward**  
**Homosexuality When the Respondent Was Around**  
**15 Years of Age and of the Respondent's Current**  
**General Attitude Toward Homosexuality ( $n = 2,119$ )**

	Respondent Favorable	Respondent Neutral	Respondent Unfavorable	Total
Mother favorable	26.6	3.0	1.4	13.5
Mother neutral	37.4	39.3	14.3	35.2
Mother unfavorable	23.2	33.0	68.5	33.2
Don't know	12.9	24.7	15.8	18.2
Total	100% ( $n = 963$ )	100% ( $n = 877$ )	100% ( $n = 279$ )	100% ( $n = 2,119$ )

parents, which generally leads to less severe distortions. We return to this matter in our discussion. In Table 3, we cross-tabulated the mother's attitude with that of the respondent. This table shows us that there is an association between the two, as almost none of the respondents with an unfavorable attitude toward homosexuals had a mother approving homosexuality. Respondents with a neutral position were more unaware of their mother's attitude. Additional analyses revealed that age particularly is an important determinant: Older people are more likely of not knowing their parents' attitudes. This is also true of people from non-Western origins. Both older people and immigrants are expected to have lived in an environment with less discussion about homosexuality, which possibly explains their overrepresentation among people with "don't know" as an answer. Finally, there is a small effect of education ( $p = .048$ ), showing that lower educated more

often do not know their parents' attitudes than higher educated respondents. Gender, sexual orientation, and religiousness have no effect.

*Educational level of the parents.* Respondents were asked to provide the educational level for both of their parents. The possible answers were divided into seven categories: primary school, lower secondary school for vocational education (LBO), secondary school for vocational education (MAVO), secondary school for professional education, university preparatory secondary school (HAVO and VWO), professional college, and university. If respondents answered that they did not know what the educational level of their mother was ( $n = 77$ , 3.6%), we substituted missing values by regression on the mother's occupational status, the father's educational level and occupational status, and finally the country of origin. For fathers (4.6% missing values) the same procedure was followed. The mother's and father's education correlate was .59.

*Religion of the parents.* We used the parents' church attendance to assess their degree of religiousness. Respondents could indicate whether their parents never went to a church or religious community, or if they went once or a few times per year, about once a month, about once a week, or more than once a week. The five possible answers were coded according to the number of times per month parents visited a church or religious community, so that the distance between the answer options corresponded with the differences in frequency of church attendance. Mother's and father's church attendance correlate strongly: .85.

*Characteristics of the respondent, church membership.* The respondents were asked whether they considered themselves to be members of a church or religious community and, if so, of which church or religious community. For the Christian denominations, we retained the categories from the questionnaire, which distinguished Roman Catholic (24.2%), Dutch Reformed (11.2%), Calvinist (6.1%), and Other Christian (4.4%). Of the non-Christian denominations, only the Muslim group was listed as a separate category. However, because the number of Muslims in the data set is small ( $n = 19$ ), we decided to merge them with the other respondents belonging to a non-Christian religious community in the category non-Christian, which comprises 1.4% of the respondents ( $n = 29$ ). In addition, 52.7% of the respondents did not consider themselves as members of a denomination.

*Religious school.* Almost three quarters (70.6%) of the respondents went to a primary school based on religious precepts. The various religious faiths mentioned were merged into a single category: school based on religious principles.

*Religious environment.* To discern whether a person's religious environment plays a role in the degree of objecting to same-sex marriage, we included two measures for the religiousness of the respondent's place of residence. For this we matched data from the Netherlands Family Survey with that from Statistics Netherlands (CBS 2005) regarding the Dutch COROP regions (one so-called COROP region consists of a number of bordering municipalities; there are 40 of these regions in the Netherlands). A more refined measurement was impossible because of the lack of detailed data (i.e., the percentage of religious residents per municipality). Statistics Netherlands obtains its figures for the percentage of members for a particular church by means of surveys on the ongoing quality of life. Aggregates from the period 2000 to 2003 were used in the current analyses. In so doing, we make a distinction between the percentage of Catholics and the percentage of members of the Protestant Church of the Netherlands, the latter composed of the sum of member percentages of the Dutch Reformed Church and Calvinists. Catholics comprise 2.8% (Delfzijl and surroundings) to 81.6% (central Limburg) and Protestants a minimum of 1.5% (central Limburg) to a maximum of 50.3% (northern Overijssel).

*Religious practice.* The scale of religious practice consists of three items. The respondents were questioned directly on how frequently they currently attended services and celebrations at their church or religious community. The answers ran in five categories from almost never to more than once a week. Moreover, respondents were asked to what extent they prayed and read religious books—also measured in five categories. The three measures constitute a reliable scale of religious practice (Cronbach's  $\alpha = .83$ ).

*Educational level and field of study.* The respondent's highest level of education attained was categorized in the same fashion as that of the parents. After tests of linearity we decided to include the measures as interval determinants. In addition to the level of education, a categorization was made for the field of study. A total of 13 fields of study were distinguished, in addition to the general education category (30.9% of the respondents). In a number of the categories, however, there were very few respondents, leading us to group these into four main categories. The fields of study with



personal contact with clients or students (educationalist, sociocultural, (para)medical, public order or safety, and personal care) were merged under the title sociocultural or medical (25.8%); the fields language or history, arts, and law were merged into the category language or law (4.0%); the economic and commercial category was kept as a single category (16.2%); and finally, study fields classified as agrarian, mathematics or physics, technical, and transportation or communication were brought together under technical or agrarian (23.1%).

*Cohabitation status, sex, and age.* Respondents in a single-person household were separated out from the other respondents, which were grouped into the categories opposite-sex relationship, married; opposite-sex relationship, living together unmarried; and same-sex relationship. Fifteen couples maintained a household in which both partners were of the same sex. Of the single-person households, however, we do not know whether the respondent had a preference for someone of the same or of the opposite sex, simply because this was not asked. Sex and age were measured just by asking and recorded accordingly.

*Origin.* To measure the country of origin of the respondent, we followed the operationalization used by Statistics Netherlands for people of foreign origin, which looks at whether at least one of the parents was born abroad. This measure of origin is independent of the place of birth of the respondents themselves. Of the 217 respondents classified as of foreign origin, 72.8% originated from a Western country and 32.2% from a non-Western motherland.

The descriptive data for all variables under study are listed in Appendix A. Here we also present the bivariate correlations between the dependent variable and the independent characteristics.

## Results

To answer our question as to which categories of persons are more strongly in favor of abolishing same-sex marriage, we performed multinomial logistic regression. We estimated the probability of favoring abolishing same-sex marriage versus the probability of opposing it, and the probability of staying neutral versus the probability of opposing to abolishing same-sex marriage.

We present the results of these analyses in a number of successive models, by providing the logits with their standard errors and the odds ratios shown in Tables 4 and 5. We start with the models with the characteristics

(text continues on page 1733)

**Table 4**  
**Logits (*B*) and Odds Ratios (*e<sup>B</sup>*) of Multinomial Logistic Regression of Proponents and Neutrals Toward**  
**the Abolition of Same-Sex Marriage Versus Abolition Opponents: Models 1 and 2 (*n* = 2,124)**

	Model 1			Model 2		
	Favor Abolition		Neutral on Abolition	Favor Abolition		Neutral on Abolition
	<i>B</i> ( <i>SE</i> )	Exp( <i>B</i> )	<i>B</i> ( <i>SE</i> )	Exp( <i>B</i> )	<i>B</i> ( <i>SE</i> )	Exp( <i>B</i> )
Mother's characteristics						
Educational level	-0.12* (0.05)	0.89	-0.18** (0.04)	0.84	-0.04 (0.05)	0.96
Church attendance	0.26** (0.02)	1.30	0.10** (0.02)	1.11	0.20** (0.02)	1.22
Attitude toward homosexuality						
(Strongly) favorable					-1.30** (0.37)	0.27
Neutral <sup>a</sup>					-1.34** (0.27)	0.26
(Strongly) unfavorable					1.03** (0.16)	2.88
Don't know					0.31 (0.21)	1.36
Constant	-2.04		-1.23		-2.34	-1.31
Model $\chi^2$		169.12				310.38
$\chi^2$ change		169.12**				141.26**
$\Delta df$		4				6
Nagelkerke $R^2$		.09				.16
McFadden $R^2$		.05				.08

Source: Netherlands Family Survey 2003.

a. Reference category.

\* $p < .05$ , \*\* $p < .01$ .

**Table 5**  
**Logits ( $B$ ) and Odds Ratios ( $e^B$ ) of Multinomial Logistic Regression**  
**of Proponents and Neutrals Toward the Abolition of Same-Sex Marriage**  
**Versus Abolition Opponents: Models 3 and 4 ( $n = 2,124$ )**

	Model 3			Model 4		
	Favor Abolition		Neutral Toward Abolition	Favor Abolition		Neutral Abolition Toward
	$B$ ( $SE$ )	Exp( $B$ )	$B$ ( $SE$ )	Exp( $B$ )	$B$ ( $SE$ )	Exp( $B$ )
Mother's characteristics						
Educational level	-0.02 (0.06)	0.98	-0.01 (0.05)	0.99	0.01 (0.06)	1.01
Church attendance	0.13** (0.03)	1.14	0.07* (0.03)	1.07	0.03 (0.03)	1.03
Attitude toward homosexuality						
(Strongly) favorable	-1.15** (0.38)	0.32	-1.19** (0.27)	0.30	-0.90* (0.38)	0.41
Neutral <sup>a</sup>						
(Strongly) unfavorable	0.90** (0.17)	2.46	0.17 (0.15)	1.18	0.76** (0.18)	2.13
Don't know	0.20 (0.22)	1.22	0.39* (0.16)	1.48	0.13 (0.23)	1.13
Respondent's characteristics						
Highest educational level completed	-0.15** (0.05)	0.86	-0.17** (0.04)	0.84	-0.17** (0.05)	0.85
Field of study						
General	0.28 (0.22)	1.32	0.09 (0.19)	1.09	0.36 (0.24)	1.44

(continued)

Table 5 (continued)

	Model 3			Model 4		
	Favor Abolition		Neutral Toward Abolition	Favor Abolition		Neutral Abolition Toward
	<i>B (SE)</i>	<i>Exp(B)</i>		<i>B (SE)</i>	<i>Exp(B)</i>	
Sociocultural or medical <sup>a</sup>						
Language or law	0.33 (0.41)	1.39	0.25 (0.35)	0.24 (0.43)	1.27	0.20 (0.35)
Commercial	0.12 (0.25)	1.13	0.32 (0.20)	0.34 (0.26)	1.40	0.37 <sup>†</sup> (0.20)
Technical or agrarian	0.42* (0.22)	1.52	0.23 (0.20)	0.54* (0.25)	1.72	0.26 (0.20)
Church membership						
Not a church member <sup>a</sup>						
Roman Catholic	0.20 (0.21)	1.22	0.32 <sup>†</sup> (0.17)	-0.34 (0.23)	0.71	0.15 (0.17)
Dutch Reformed	0.97** (0.22)	2.63	0.13 (0.21)	-0.56* (0.28)	0.57	-0.40 (0.25)
Calvinist	1.27** (0.27)	3.55	0.44 (0.28)	0.60 <sup>†</sup> (0.36)	0.55	-0.20 (0.33)
Other, Christian	1.93** (0.28)	6.90	-0.06 (0.40)	-0.06 (0.37)	0.94	-0.77 <sup>†</sup> (0.44)
Other, non-Christian	0.51 (0.61)	1.67	0.54 (0.55)	-0.24 (0.66)	0.79	0.23 (0.57)
Religious school						
Yes	0.09 (0.19)	1.09	-0.08 (0.15)	-0.07 (0.20)	0.93	-0.10 (0.16)
% Protestants living in the region	0.02** (0.01)	1.02	0.02** (0.01)	0.02 <sup>†</sup> (0.01)	1.02	0.02* (0.01)
% Catholics living in the region	0.01 (0.01)	1.01	0.01* (0.00)	0.01 <sup>†</sup> (0.01)	1.01	0.01* (0.00)
Sex						
Male	0.34* (0.17)	1.41	0.30* (0.14)	0.48** (0.18)	1.62	0.34* (0.14)

(continued)

**Table 5 (continued)**

	Model 3			Model 4		
	Favor Abolition		Neutral Toward Abolition	Favor Abolition		Neutral Abolition Toward
	<i>B</i> ( <i>SE</i> )	Exp( <i>B</i> )	<i>B</i> ( <i>SE</i> )	Exp( <i>B</i> )	<i>B</i> ( <i>SE</i> )	Exp( <i>B</i> )
Origin						
Western countries	0.35 (0.26)	1.42	0.13 (0.23)	1.13	0.32 (0.28)	1.38
Non-Western countries	1.14** (0.43)	3.13	0.85* (0.38)	2.34	0.89* (0.45)	2.43
Religious practice					1.06** (0.10)	2.89
Constant	-3.34		-2.27		-4.64	
Model $\chi^2$		506.80			640.09	
$\chi^2$ change		196.42**			133.29**	
$\Delta df$		40			2	
Nagelkerke $R^2$		.26			.31	

Source: Netherlands Family Survey 2003.

Note: Age and cohabitation status are controlled for in all models.

a. Reference category.

\* $p < .10$ . \*\* $p < .05$ . \*\*\* $p < .01$ .

of the family of origin. First are the secondary-primary characteristics, namely, the educational level and the church attendance of the mother. Then, we add the primary characteristic: the mother's attitude toward homosexuality. Subsequently, we add the secondary socialization characteristics: the characteristics of the respondent. In the fourth model we add the remaining religious practice measurement to find out to what extent it explains differences between religious denominations.

Respondents whose mother attended a church or meetings of a religious community more frequently during their socialization stage have a greater probability of opposing same-sex marriage, as we predicted. The odds of staying neutral versus opposed to abolishing same-sex marriage increase with the frequency of church attendance of the mother. Although a higher education of the mother decreases the probability of favoring a ban on same-sex marriage, the effect parameter is just significant at  $p < .05$ . A higher education of the mother particularly decreases the probability of neutrality on the question, contrasted to opposing abolition of same-sex marriage. The explanatory power of the model (Nagelkerke  $R^2 = .09$ ) is primarily accounted for by the church attendance of the mother.

In Model 2 we show that respondents whose mother approved of homosexuality in their youth have a considerably smaller probability of objecting to same-sex marriage or of being neutral than respondents whose mother was judged as having a neutral attitude,  $B = -1.30$  ( $e^B = 0.27$ ) and  $B = -1.34$  ( $e^B = 0.26$ ), respectively. The estimated odds ratio of the likelihood to abolish same-sex marriage for respondents whose mother disapproved of homosexuality versus a mother approving it is as large as 10.18 (not in the table). In addition, it turns out that children of mothers who disapproved of homosexuality have a much greater probability of opposing same-sex marriage than respondents with neutral mothers,  $B = 1.03$  ( $e^B = 2.88$ ). Respondents who had no idea about their mother's views turn out to have a greater probability of being neutral toward same-sex marriage versus the probability of approving it, compared to respondents whose mother was judged as being neutral.

In the second model there is a strong reduction in the direct effect of the mother's educational level and church attendance. The effect of mother's educational level is even no longer significant. We conclude that mothers with a lower education and more frequent church attendance had a more pronounced unfavorable attitude toward homosexuality, and therefore their children are more likely to object to same-sex marriage. Moreover, the higher explanatory power of the model shows that the mother's attitude not only explains the secondary-primary socialization effects of mother's education and religion but also has an extra effect over and beyond the secondary-primary socialization (Nagelkerke  $R^2$  increases from .09 to .16).

In Appendix B, we compare the effects of mother's characteristics with that of the father's. Unsurprisingly, the models are highly comparable because we previously showed that the correlations between the parental characteristics correlate strongly (education of father and mother .59, church attendance of father and mother .85, and the attitude to homosexuality of father and mother .75). Still, in the somewhat smaller subset of respondents due to a larger number of missing fathers than mothers, the effects of the father's characteristics are stronger than those of the mother's, which contrasts our expectations. A possible interpretation is the more pronounced view of fathers toward homosexuality as compared with that of mothers; more respondents thought their father to hold an unfavorable opinion than their mother.

### **Influence of Secondary Socialization**

In the third model, presented in Table 5, we add the educational and religious characteristics of the respondent. In conformance with earlier research, educational level is found to influence the attitude toward same-sex marriage, as evidenced by the significant negative effect. As the educational level increases, the probability of a person wanting to abolish same-sex marriage diminishes,  $B = -0.15$  ( $e^B = 0.86$ ). As for the fields of study, only one parameter is significant: Respondents from technical or agrarian fields of study are more likely to favor abolishing same-sex marriage compared with those educated in sociocultural or medical fields. The effect is small though. We found that existing differences between fields of study in the attitude toward same-sex marriage are foremost explained by gender differences: Men turned out to be significantly more likely to reject same-sex marriage than were women. Because men are the primary participants in technical or agrarian areas of study, it explains the differences between the fields of study, even though there remains a small effect from the technical or agrarian field of study.

Church membership is largely important. However, Roman Catholics do not differ in their likelihood to want same-sex marriage abolished from people who are not members of the church. This may be surprising, but the Dutch considering themselves Roman Catholic are more often less conservative. Moreover, a large part of the Roman Catholics hardly attend Church and are therefore nonpracticing Catholic. The effect parameters of the Dutch Reformed respondents,  $B = 0.97$  ( $e^B = 2.55$ ), and Calvinists,  $B = 1.27$  ( $e^B = 3.55$ ), are about the same in size; they are more likely to advocate abolishing same-sex marriage. All protestant denominations differ significantly from Catholics. The Dutch Reformed and Calvinists, however, do not

differ from each other. Other Christians turned out to have a much stronger chance of rejecting same-sex marriage than non-Church members,  $B = 1.93$  ( $e^B = 6.90$ ). Non-Christians are not significantly more likely to want same-sex marriage abolished. This absence of effect is explained by the introduction of the country of origin. Among people from non-Western origin, the probability of rejecting same-sex marriage is greater than that among the native Dutch,  $B = 1.14$  ( $e^B = 3.13$ ). The probability of having a neutral attitude toward same-sex marriage versus opposing to abolish it is also larger among people from non-Western origin than among Dutch natives,  $B = 0.85$  ( $e^B = 2.34$ ). To disentangle effects from non-Christian religion and country of origin, we think larger groups of the respective categories need to be sampled. We could not corroborate significant differences between Western immigrants and native Dutch.

The effect of having attended a religious school is about zero and has no effect next to church membership. In addition, we find a small effect of the environment in which one lives: Where there were more Protestants living in the area, a person had a greater chance of rejecting or being neutral toward abolishing same-sex marriage. For the percentage of Catholics, the parameter only reaches significance estimating the probability to be neutral as compared to oppose abolition. These contextual effects indicate that where a disapproving norm is more palpably in evidence, it is more likely to be adopted in opinions about same-sex marriage, even beyond church walls.

We found no effect of age, though we had expected a significant positive effect. Persons living with a same-sex partner—obviously—tend to be less favorable or neutral toward abolishing same-sex marriage. However, because not one gay person in the data favored abolition, we could not calculate an effect parameter in the model that would estimate a gay person's probability of favoring a ban on same-sex marriage. Cohabiting heterosexuals and persons who were single did not differ from married heterosexuals in their rejection of same-sex marriage.

The explanatory power of the third model is clearly improved compared with the second model. The Nagelkerke  $R^2$  increases to .26. Moreover, we notice that in this third model, the effect of the mother's attitude toward homosexuality, though diminished somewhat, can still be described as strong. The influence of the mother's church attendance does become a great deal weaker, but it is still significant. The direct influences of the mother's attitude and of her church attendance therefore remain, alongside the influence of the respondent's own educational level and own church membership.



The differences between the denominations are, as demonstrated in Model 4 of Table 5, completely explained by variations in religiousness. The strong effect of this—the stronger the religious practice, the greater the probability of objecting to same-sex marriage—together with the turnover of the effects of the denominations in Model 4 from positive to negative, indicate that the strength of a person's ties to religion is more important than the denomination itself. In Appendix C we present the interaction effects between religious practice and denomination—for religious respondents only. The effect parameter of religious practice (0.71) stands for the reference category: the Roman Catholics. The effect of religious practice is however much stronger for the other denominations, but the difference in strength of the effect reaches significance only for the Calvinists,  $B = 1.33$  ( $0.71 + 0.62$ ), and other Christians,  $B = 2.09$  ( $0.71 + 1.38$ ). These results show that integration effects are stronger for Protestant than for Catholic Church members. Our results provide evidence that Catholics in general, but also a Catholic environment and stronger integration into Catholicism, are less decisive for the attitude toward homosexuality than these aspects are for Dutch Protestants. Dutch Catholics have often been seen as a thorn in the flesh of the Roman Catholic Church—particularly when in 1985 a movement within the Dutch Catholic Church demonstrated against Pope John Paul II's conservatism.

The effect of the mother's church attendance disappears once the respondent's own religious practice is included. The effect is completely explained by the attitude of the mother toward homosexuality—which remains significant in this final model—and the religiousness of the respondent. In other words, in addition to the mother's attitude, a person's own religion determines the degree to which they reject same-sex marriage. Beyond that, the mother's religion has no direct influence.

To compare the strength of the parameters from Model 4 in Table 5, we show in Table 6 the degree to which the explanatory power is diminished by removing each characteristic from the model. From this we see that religious practice by far contributes the most to explaining the rejection of same-sex marriage, followed by the attitude of the respondent's mother when he or she was about 15 years old. These are followed by the sex and educational level as important determinants of rejecting same-sex marriage. Church membership is—set out to the costs in degrees of freedom—just significant. Finally, we note the percentage of Protestants and Catholics living in the respondent's area.

**Table 6**  
**Importance of the Different Determinants in Explaining Attitude**  
**Toward the Abolition of Same-Sex Marriage, by Removing One**  
**Characteristic From Model 4 in Table 5 ( $n = 2,124$ )**

Characteristic Removed	$\chi^2$ Loss
Mother's educational level	0.06
Mother's church attendance	2.28
Mother's attitude toward homosexuality	57.22**
Respondent's highest educational level completed	21.73**
Respondent's field of study	7.83
Respondent's church membership	17.25†
Respondent's religious elementary school	0.44
% Protestants living in the region	7.69*
% Catholics living in the region	6.32*
Sex	10.84**
Origin	7.01
Religious practice	133.29**
Model $\chi^2$	640.09

Source: Netherlands Family Survey 2003.

† $p < .10$ . \* $p < 0.05$ . \*\* $p < .01$ .

## Discussion

Using data from a country where same-sex marriage has been legalized, we have shown the extent to which primary, secondary-primary, and purely secondary socialization play a role in rejecting same-sex marriage. Effects of secondary-primary socialization turn out to be merely indirect. The attitude of the father and mother toward homosexuality is determined by their religiousness and education. Moreover, we know that the parental educational level influences that of their children and that the parental religiousness influences the church membership and church attendance of their children. However, neither of these aspects of the family of origin directly influences the rejection of same-sex marriage after we discount secondary socialization.

Still, the family of origin plays an important role in the extent to which a person rejects same-sex marriage. If the mother or father in the respondent's youth held a (strongly) unfavorable view of homosexuality, then the probability is considerably larger that this respondent objects to same-sex marriage, regardless of his or her own religious practice or educational level. If the mother or father held a positive attitude toward homosexuality, then the probability is smaller that the respondent feels neutral or opposes

same-sex marriage. We see this as a confirmation of the existence of effects of primary socialization. The importance of parental attitude suggests that the views of parents and their children are very similar. Still, we observe that the general attitude toward homosexuality has undergone a turnaround within one generation, from a predominantly negative to a predominately positive one. A person who favors abolishing same-sex marriage, however, almost always has had a mother with a negative (70% of the time) or neutral stance (27%) toward homosexuality. As we found no effect of age of the respondent, we have no evidence for the existence of cohort effects. Consequently, period effects should account for the general changes.

Regarding the retrospective measurements of parent's attitude and related measurement errors, we make three comments. First, it appears that respondents, in assessing their parents' attitude, do not simply adjust their assessment to correspond more closely to their own views. For that to be the case, the differences between the answers of the respondent and those they ascribed to their parents are too pronounced. Second, although the correlation between the mother's attitude and that of the father's is strong (.75), respondents evaluate the attitude of the father as less favorable than that of the mother, which is consistent with the findings from previous research as well as with current findings showing men as less favorable to homosexuality than women. Third, we found that respondents did not base their assessment of the parental attitude on the mother's church attendance only. Here too, we found that although the expected association exists, the correlation is far from perfect. These findings strengthen our confidence in the measurements used. Nonetheless, we consider further investigation of the problems surrounding retrospective measurements to be a worthwhile path for future research. De Vries (2006) provided a unique study of the reliability of retrospective measurements regarding church attendance, political party preference, cultural participation, education, and occupation of the parents using information from respondents, their siblings, and their parents. This should be replicated for attitude measurements.

Although it is true that same-sex marriage can reckon on the approval of the majority of the Dutch population, large differences are nonetheless evident between the religious and nonreligious, and between lower and higher educated people in the extent to which they would like to outlaw same-sex marriage. It is not unlikely that these effects are more pronounced in a country where same-sex marriage has been legalized. Supporting abolishment of same-sex marriage in a country where it is legalized would be a more extreme position than opposing legalization in countries where same-sex marriages are not (yet) legal. An interesting finding yielded by the multinomial logistic

regression analysis is that religious characteristics particularly distinguish those in favor of abolishing same-sex marriage from those against, whereas education equally strongly distinguishes opponents of abolishing same-sex marriage from those with a neutral attitude toward the issue. The lower educated were more likely than the higher educated to indicate their neutrality on abolishing same-sex marriage. We suspect that the choice for the neutral category toward same-sex marriage is possibly based on its not being an issue and therefore provoking indifference, or perhaps that the predominantly positive opinion in the Netherlands led to a respondent's somewhat negative attitude being packaged in a more neutral guise. For those who are religious, a similar peer pressure spurs rejection, with religious respondents more likely to oppose same-sex marriage.

One's own religion is, to a particularly strong degree, important in determining one's position toward same-sex marriage. We note however that also among the Dutch Reformed and Calvinists a majority opposes abolishing same-sex marriage. Only among those of other Christian faiths we find a majority in favor of abolition. It is noteworthy that Catholics do not differ from non-Church members and that they have a less unfavorable view of same-sex marriage than Protestants. The stance of the Catholic Church, which is often more explicitly opposed than, for example, the Protestant Church of the Netherlands, is thus not adopted by Dutch Catholics.

We have further shown that the strength of the ties to a religious community, as measured by religious practice, is of importance. Differences between the denominations in their objection to same-sex marriage are attributable, to a large extent, to differences in the religious practice of members. Moreover, the interaction between religious practice and denomination showed that integration in the Protestant churches leads to a stronger desire to abolish gay marriage than integration in the Catholic Church. Whether a person went to a religious school makes little difference in objecting to same-sex marriage. The same cannot be said for environments where a high proportion of Protestants live. The higher the percentage is, the stronger the rejection of same-sex marriage. This effect exists alongside that of one's religiousness. These findings support hypotheses on purely secondary socialization.

In this contribution we have also shown that men and women differ noticeably in the degree to which they favor abolishing same-sex marriage. It might be that a reference to same-sex marriage is more readily associated with man-man couples than with woman-woman pairs and that it therefore provokes a different response in men than in women. But we

also think that men, more than women, attach value to stereotypical role patterns that confirm their masculinity (*casu quo* femininity). Environments in which men are overrepresented, such as in technical schools, will reinforce these role patterns. An example of research that might provide more insight into the relationship between gender and attitude toward homosexuality would address, for example, health club membership and team sports participation, particularly in the socialization stage, where we could expect locker room talk, especially among men, to influence attitudes toward homosexuality.

People from non-Western origins are more fervent in their objection to same-sex marriage. If the Netherlands wants to maintain its broad support for same-sex marriage, it is imperative for these groups that schools, as secondary socialization venues, not only transfer the principles of equality and all of the implications surrounding them, but also break the silence on the subject of homosexuality. After all, we found that education leads to a greater acceptance of same-sex marriage. In view of the strong influence of the attitude prevailing within the family of origin, it is particularly important for non-Western students to learn about homosexuality and the current Dutch norms related to it. This holds true for Protestants as well. Our finding that religious practice strongly associates with rejection of same-sex marriage clearly demonstrates the challenges gay emancipation groups face within the Church.

## Appendix A

### Descriptive Statistics of Independent Characteristics (*n* = 2,124)

Model	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Association ( <i>r</i> ) With Dependent Variable: Abolition of Same-Sex Marriage
Mother characteristics				
Educational level	0	6	1.27	-.10**
Church attendance	0	8	2.42	.28**
Attitude toward homosexuality				
(Strongly) favorable	0	1	0.14	-.23**
Neutral	0	1	0.35	-.12**
(Strongly) unfavorable	0	1	0.33	.27**
Don't know	0	1	0.18	.03
Respondent characteristics				
Highest educational level completed	0	6	2.85	-.13**
Field of study				
General	0	1	0.31	.04
Sociocultural or medical	0	1	0.24	-.09**
Language or law	0	1	0.04	-.04
Commercial	0	1	0.16	-.03
Technical or agrarian	0	1	0.23	.10**
Church membership				
Not a church member	0	1	0.54	-.24**
Roman Catholic	0	1	0.24	.02
Dutch Reformed	0	1	0.11	.09**
Calvinist	0	1	0.06	.15**
Other, Christian	0	1	0.04	.19**
Other, non-Christian	0	1	0.01	.05*
Religious school				
Yes	0	1	0.71	.11**
% Protestants living in the region	1.50	50.30	19.78	.10**
% Catholics living in the region	2.80	81.60	30.93	-.02
Age	18	79	44.07	.09**
Sex				
Man	0	1	49.01	.12**
Origin				
Netherlands	0	1	0.90	-.06**
Western countries	0	1	0.07	.02
Non-Western countries	0	1	0.03	.08**

(continued)

## Appendix A (continued)

Models	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Association ( <i>r</i> ) With Dependent Variable: Abolition of Same-Sex Marriage
Cohabitation status				
Heterosexual, married	0	1	0.80	.11**
Heterosexual, cohabiting	0	1	0.07	-.09**
Homosexual, married or living together	0	1	0.01	-.09**
Single	0	1	0.12	-.02
Religious practice	1	5	1.68	.46**

Source: Netherlands Family Survey 2003.

\* $p < .05$ . \*\* $p < .01$ .

## Appendix B

### Comparison of Effects From Father's Characteristics With Effects From Mother's Characteristics ( $n = 2,059$ in Model A and $n = 2,124$ in Model B)

	Model A: Father's Characteristics ( <i>B</i> )		Model B: Mother's Characteristics ( <i>B</i> )	
	Favor Abolition	Neutral on Abolition	Favor Abolition	Neutral on Abolition
Parents' characteristics				
Educational level	-0.08*	-0.09*	-0.04	-0.10*
Church attendance	0.26**	0.07**	0.20**	0.08**
Attitude toward homosexuality				
(Strongly) favorable	-1.36**	-2.31**	-1.30**	-1.34**
Neutral <sup>a</sup>				
(Strongly) unfavorable	1.02**	0.51**	1.03**	0.24
Don't know	0.43*	0.60**	0.31	0.54**

(continued)

## Appendix B (continued)

	Model A: Father's Characteristics ( <i>B</i> )		Model B: Mother's Characteristics ( <i>B</i> )	
	Favor Abolition	Neutral on Abolition	Favor Abolition	Neutral on Abolition
Constant	-2.54	-1.45	-2.34	-1.31
Model $\chi^2$		326.04		310.38
<i>df</i>		10		10
Nagelkerke $R^2$		.18		.16
McFadden $R^2$		.09		.08

Source: Netherlands Family Survey 2003.

a. Reference category.

\* $p < .05$ . \*\* $p < .01$ .

## Appendix C

### Interaction Between Religious Practice and Denomination; Selection of Respondents Considering Themselves as Members of a Church ( $n = 1,004$ )

	Favor Abolition ( <i>B</i> )	Neutral on Abolition ( <i>B</i> )
Church membership		
Roman Catholic <sup>a</sup>		
Dutch Reformed	-1.02	-0.12
Calvinist	-2.19*	0.09
Other, Christian	-3.98**	-1.68
Other, non-Christian	-0.05	-0.91
Religious practice	0.71**	0.48**
Interactions		
Roman Catholic $\times$ Religious Practice <sup>a</sup>		
Dutch Reformed $\times$ Religious Practice	0.33	-0.22
Calvinist $\times$ Religious Practice	0.62*	-0.22
Other, Christian $\times$ Religious Practice	1.38**	0.26
Other, Non-Christian $\times$ Religious Practice	0.48	0.65

a. Reference category.

\* $p < .05$ . \*\* $p < .01$ .

## Notes

1. Data sets from Social and Cultural Changes (SCV) from the SCP.
2. Data sets from Social and Cultural Changes Netherlands (SOCON) from the University of Nijmegen.



3. The 1.1% respondents did not differ in gender, age, and church visits. People with a missing score were on average more often a migrant and lower educated.

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